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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
On the afternoon of September 12, 1992, the order was given to take over 
the long-observed house in the district of Los Sauces in the Lima suburbs.  
Armed only with two revolvers, a couple of nervous agents broke into the two-
story residence, where they found three women on the first floor. The agents felt 
hidden eyes observing them from the second floor. One of the agents climbed up 
the stairs and broke into a room where Shining Path’s leader, Abimael Ruben 
Guzman Reynoso, was found sitting with his girlfriend who tried to protect him.  
"You have cut short the revolution” she said to the agents.  
Defeating terrorism requires the application of an integrated state strategy 
that identifies the multiple aspects of the conflict, analyses them in depth, 
prepares a policy, and assigns tasks to the respective agencies and institutions 
in charge of them. The effectiveness of the state against terrorism depends on 
the frequency and determination with which the counterterrorist attacks apply all 
the tools of statecraft: diplomatic, economic, military and psychological.1 These 
instruments must be used against all levels of the terrorist organization and must 
be directed by the estimated effect of each individual action, given the general 
situation and the nature of the particular terrorist organization.  
Focusing on the terrorist leader is a traditional aspect of counterterrorist 
warfare. Examples abound, from the first terrorist organization, the Assassins, to 
more recent efforts to capture Osama bin Laden. In the Peruvian case, the 
situation leading up to September 1992 was extremely unstable. The Shining 
Path or Sendero Luminoso (SL) terrorist group was active in 114 out of 183 
Peruvian provinces, and as the final stage of its revolution neared, terrorist 
attacks in the cities were carried out on a daily basis. The state decided to 
                                            
1 The White House, “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” February 2003, 2. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.
pdf. Accessed February 10, 2005. 
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strengthen its strategy of hunting for the terrorist leader, and achieved success 
through the work of a police unit called the Special Intelligence Group (SIG). 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the particular working process and 
procedures applied by the SIG to succeed in the sensitive case of the capture of 
the terrorist organization’s top leader, in order to apply these same processes 
and procedures, with appropriate modifications, to similar cases. In this thesis, it 
is hypothesized that the success of the Special Intelligence Group depended on 
four variables: decision making capability, strong leadership, secrecy, and 
exclusive dedication. The identified variables were present during SIG 
operations, whether they were explicitly granted to the group or the group simply 
took them for granted. Beginning in January 1979, when Guzman went 
underground, Peruvian units with the same objective were created within the 
armed forces and the police. Yet none of these units succeeded. In that regard, 
the specific strengths and weaknesses of SIG will be observed in order to 
present decision makers with an example that may be applied to future 
situations, in Peru or elsewhere, taking into consideration the characteristics of 
any particular insurgency and its leaders.  
SIG procedures will be analyzed, including their vigilance over terrorist 
networks and hubs and their avoidance of momentary success in capturing low-
value targets in order to reach the higher-value targets of the terrorist network. 
Several other captures followed the apprehension of Guzman.  In this study, the 
combined effect of the capture of Guzman and the others upon the partial defeat 
of the Shining Path will be evaluated. 
The issue of terrorist manhunts arises today as a consequence of the 
tragic events of September 11, 2001.  The increasing threat of terrorism brings 
up the questions of the effects and worthiness of counterterrorist leader 
operations and the topic of this study: what elements are necessary for the group 





This thesis was developed using a single case study: the Peruvian 
success in capturing the Shining Path terrorist organization leader Abimael 
Ruben Guzman Reynoso and the subsequent control of the terrorist threat in 
Peru. The case was selected because it portrays an internal conflict that was 
increasingly deteriorating and could have led to the insurgency’s success.  When 
the Shining Path leader was captured, the situation changed dramatically in favor 
of the state, and within two years the terrorist organization was disbanded. The 
case study shows how leadership decapitation affects this type of organization, 
not only ideologically and militarily, but more importantly, psychologically as well.  
The information used to support this study comes from personal interviews 
with key personnel involved in SIG operations, statistics, and a review of the 
available literature. 
The interviews regarding the Special Intelligence Group were conducted 
with individuals on both ends of the chain of command. First, the responsible 
leaders of Peruvian counterinsurgency policy were interviewed to obtain the 
picture from the top down; then lower officers were interviewed to obtain the 
picture from the bottom up. The police officers interviewed include the National 
Counterterrorism Director, the SIG’s Commander, Operations Officer, Senior 
Analyst, and the agent who led the team and physically caught Guzman. 
Peruvian and international sources have provided the statistical data. Among the 
Peruvian sources consulted were the Counter Terrorism Directorate, the National 
Intelligence Service, and national circulation magazines like Caretas and Debate. 
Statistics on terrorist activity throughout the period of time relevant to the study 
were provided by the DESCO organization, the owners of a complete database 
on the subject.   
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The thesis is organized in six chapters. Chapter II describes the Peruvian 
situation prior to the capture of Guzman. It presents a brief description of the 
progressive corrosion of Peruvian national institutions as a result of the terrorist 
activity and the counterterrorism policy’s lack of effectiveness. On the other hand, 
4 
in the eyes of observers, the Shining Path was consolidating an image of 
strength, although still with several flaws. President Alberto Fujimori took office 
on July 28, 1990, and passed several economic measures, which improved the 
national macroeconomic situation.  But later, the April 5, 1991 autogolpe2 was 
severely criticized internationally for moving the country away from democracy. 
The executive could pass the counterterrorism laws by presidential decree, but 
the main reason for the autogolpe, the counterterrorism policy, was not working 
as planned. Chapter II also presents the characteristics of charismatic leadership 
and places Guzman in this category. The influence that Guzman exercised over 
his militants determined the government’s decision to strengthen the leadership 
hunt. Finally, this chapter explains the possible effects of the mission of hunting 
terrorist leaders on the overall counterterrorist strategy.  
Chapter III describes the characteristics of the government organization 
and the operations carried out by SIG prior to the Victoria operation in which 
Guzman was apprehended. These operations served as a trial and error learning 
system for SIG. To take account of the Peruvian situation, the group had to be 
organized to overcome specific obstacles, and had to develop not only a legal-
police procedure but also had to figure out the instruments to keep SIG operating 
as a cohesive organization.  
Chapter IV narrates the Victoria operation as the consequence of all 
previous SIG operations. Even after having presented results to the state, the 
SIG was still operating with limitations. In the aftermath of the terrorist leader's 
capture in September 1992, the Shining Path’s operations declined, but the 
dramatic downturn came during 1993 and 1994, when most of the mid-level 
leaders were captured.  
Chapter V is based on the SIG operations and their learning by trial and 
error process.  It explains the variables determining SIG’s success: decision 
making capability, leadership, secrecy and isolation, and exclusive dedication.  It  
                                            
2 Self inflicted coup d’état. 
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also presents the main lessons learned from this case study that might be used 
by decision makers considering terrorist leader capture operation as part of their 


























II. THE PERUVIAN SITUATION ON SEPTEMBER 11, 1992 
Fujimori took office on July 1990, a result of the Peruvian population’s 
rejection of the traditional political parties that had driven the country to 
catastrophe. Peruvians endured the 1968-80 military government with hopes for 
democracy, but up until 1990, it was clear that the governing political parties and 
state institutions were unable to address the citizens' democratic aspirations. The 
result was a search for a new political identity independent of the established 
parties which had so often let the majority of Peruvians down.3 During the first 
months of Fujimori's presidency, the administration took several drastic 
measures, but up until the first week of September 1992, internal unrest and the 
economic situation still haunted the Peruvian government. 
A. ECONOMICS 
In the economic arena, the bank nationalization and the suspension of all 
foreign payments during President Alan Garcia’s term in office (1985-1990) 
initially labeled him as a strong leader, but ultimately condemned Peruvian 
economics. Inflation grew to 1,722 percent in 1988, 2,600 percent in 1989, and 
7,650 percent in 1990. The economy declined by more than 20 percent during 
this period.4 Prices were regulated by the government, several products were 
subsidized, and foreign loans were stopped due to Garcia's refusal to honor 
external debts. After taking office in 1990, Fujimori applied most of the neoliberal 
economic measures proposed by Mario Vargas, his political opponent in the 
previous elections, measures which Fujimori himself had repeatedly downplayed. 
By March 1991, Fujimori’s administration had brought down inflation to 3.7 
percent per month, the budget had been balanced, price controls and subsidies 
had been eliminated and other economical measures made the Peruvian 
                                            
3 Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique, Peru: Time of Fear (Nottingham: Russell Press, 
1992), 136. 
4 David S. Palmer, Introduction: History, Politics, and Shining Path in Peru (New York: San 
Martin’s Press, 1994), 15. 
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economy grow 2.8 percent that year.5 On the other hand, the social cost of the 
neoliberal economic policy was enormous for the least privileged social stratum. 
Forced to tackle real market prices with no substantial income raise, the average 
Peruvian citizen was still far from satisfying his basic needs and still potential 
prey for Sendero Luminoso’s appeals or threats. In the short run, Fujimori’s 
drastic economic measures pushed 60 to 70 percent of the Peruvian population 
below the poverty line.6 
B. JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
The judicial system in Peru did not change much until 1991. It was very 
delicate for the magistrates, judges and prosecutors to produce enough evidence 
under the law to convict people under terrorism charges. As noted by Tarazona 
Sevillano, a member of the judiciary system from 1984 to 1986, the lack of 
evidence and the need to prove innocence beyond a reasonable doubt set free 
most of the detainees; handing down decisions became a psychological factor for 
judges and prosecutors, due to the consequences that conviction could carry.7 
Like any other state employee, judges and prosecutors were underpaid and not 
well protected against the SL’s permanent threat against their own lives and the 
lives of their families. Between 1980 and early 1992, 5,200 judicial processes for 
terrorism were begun, but only 552 individuals were convicted. The rest were 
released due to lack of proof.8 By 1993, terrorists had killed 13 prosecutors and 
70 peace judges.9 On top of the limitations that judges had to confront was the 
complicated nature of the Peruvian judiciary system, which slowed down the 
judicial process. 
Threatened by the terrorists and the government's consequent reaction, 
frightened peasants continued the trend of leaving the Sierra seeking security 
                                            
5 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The 
Threat of the Shining Path to Democracy in Peru: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western 
Hemisphere Affairs," 102 Congress, 2nd session, March 11, 1992, 120.    
6 Palmer, 16.  
7 U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 75.     
8 Jose Paez, Desafíos a la Pacificación  (Challenges to Pacification) (Lima: Paez, 1994), 212. 
9 Victor Manuel Quechua, Perú. 13 Años de Oprobio  (Thirteen Years of Oddity) (Lima: Tetis 
Graf, 1994), 589. 
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and better incomes. Migration from the highlands dominated by Sendero to the 
cities grew, leading to greater populations in the cities’ shantytowns. Most of the 
land invaded was private property. The migration of the upper social class 
abroad grew as well. Estimates are that during the 1980s, about 600 million 
dollars in capital fled the country every year. Between 1985 and 1990, around 
400,000 people left the country and its inherent problems.10 
C. ARMED FORCES AND NATIONAL POLICE 
On May 17, 1980, the Shining Path started the armed struggle.  A year 
afterwards, the areas threatened by SL were designated as "emergency zones" 
and put under the control of the armed forces. The army had defeated the Che-
inspired communist guerrillas of 1965 with relative ease in just seven months 
using the military approach,11 and since that time had been preparing to confront 
militarily regular armies due to the theoretical war threats posed by the 
neighboring countries of Chile and Ecuador.12 Given this experience, once in 
charge of the counterinsurgency operation, the armed forces, assuming that the 
new threat was similar to that of the 1965 guerrillas, implemented a military 
solution. The net result was a series of accusations of human rights violations 
presented by organizations like Amnesty International and the Red Cross 
International. At the end of the 1990’s, the Peruvian military was considered the 
number one violator of human rights worldwide, even though the internal unrest 
could not be controlled. However, the Peruvian military, due to the 25 to 30 years 
of training against external threats, was better than most militaries in Latin 
America. The institutional organization was solid, but it suffered from an 
overburdened command structure and inexperience in dealing with insurgency 
rather than conventional war.13 
                                            
10 Simon Strong, Shining Path, The World’s Deadliest Revolutionary Force (Lima: Peru 
Reporting, 1992), 200. 
11 For more information on the 1965 Communist guerrilla defeat see Armando Artola, 
Subversión (Subversion) (Lima: Editorial Jurídica, 1976), 10-11. 
12 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 81.    
13 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 81.    
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Peruvian Armed forces usually had a minister from each branch as a 
representative in the cabinet.14 In October 1987, the three branches were joined 
under the Ministry of Defense, losing representation in the cabinet and 
consequently losing power over the distribution of the budget. The situation for 
the police was not different. After the police unification in 1988, rivalries among 
the former three branches were deep at every echelon.15  Information sharing 
among the military intelligence directorates, the police intelligence directorate, 
and the National Intelligence Service proved ineffective.  
D. EARLY ACHIEVEMENTS, CONTRARY EFFECTS 
In September 1990, the Special Intelligence Group (SIG), a unit of the 
Counter Terrorism Directorate (DINCOTE), seized a house in the uptown 
neighborhood of Monterrico, disrupting the Sendero propaganda apparatus, and 
the next year, in January 1991, they declared the capture of electronic files and 
videos showing Guzman dancing with his deputies. The police could prove that 
Guzman was alive.16 Regrettably, Guzman had managed to escape. On the 
other hand, SL’s newspaper, El Diario, published his pictures on the first page, 
happily announcing that the terrorist leader was not only alive but also able to 
dance.17 After that action the police seemed to have lost its track of him again, 
and Guzman saw his image as "invulnerable" improve. 
In the early 1990’s, the government’s strategy changed. The war against 
terrorism would be directed by the president, the local organized militia called 
Rondas Campesinas was going to be improved, the armed forces and the 
intelligence agency were to be upgraded and integrated, and the penal law was 
going to be modified. Most of these concepts had been used already, but the 
                                            
14 Peru has a presidential democratic system; the cabinet is formed by ministers headed by a 
prime minister. 
15 Until 1988 there were three police branches in Peru: the Civil Guard, Investigative Police, 
and Republican Police. Afterwards they were reorganized in the Peruvian National Police. 
16 Guzman went underground in 1979, after which no state institution could track him. Stories 
circulated that he was in some remote area in the mountains or dead. 
17 El Diario (Lima), no. 601, April 22 1991. 
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legal framework was innovative and would support the whole strategy.18 After a 
year, however, there was no progress toward SL’s dislodgment. 
On April 5, 1992, President Fujimori dismissed the Congress, arguing that 
it was delaying all executive initiatives. The fact is that the government had failed 
to set up and implement medium and long term national objectives. It had also 
failed to get the collaboration of other political parties in confronting the terrorist 
threat and relied on the alliance with the military leaders. The autogolpe led to a 
harsh critique abroad, with Peru given the status of “civilian dictatorship” in the 
international community and limitations on international aid.  
As of 1991, 56 percent of Peruvian citizens were living under a state of 
emergency in areas where the top political military authority was a military flag 
officer and most civilian rights were suspended.19 That year the government 
estimated SL’s militant forces as between three and five thousand, but at least 
22,000 people were collaborating with them.20 
E. SENDERO LUMINOSO 
Eleven years after SL’s first symbolic action, 21 years after it became an 
independent organization lead by Guzman.21 Sendero Luminoso was solid and 
spread throughout the country with representation in 114 Peruvian provinces out 
of 183.22 
The American-Peruvian counter narcotics cooperation was seen by 
Guzman as a way to disguise the foreign counterinsurgent support.  He predicted 
the net result of full involvement during a ceremony in commemoration of the 
40th anniversary of the Chinese revolution: “Yankee aggression, direct or using  
                                            
18 For more information on the new rules see Jose Paez, Desafíos a la Pacificación  
(Challenges to Pacification) (Lima: Páez,1994), 210. 
19 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 41.    
20 Strong, 228. 
21 Benedicto Jimenez, Inicio, Desarrollo y Ocaso del Terrorismo en el Perú (Beginning, 
Development and End of Terrorism in Peru) (Lima: Vizcarra, 2000), 28. 
22 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 10.     
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its puppets, will bring us to a liberation war . . .  due to the sacrifice and effort that 
it will demand, it will have an excellent prospect of unifying 90 percent of the 
Peruvian population.”23 
Sendero built a parallel organization to the state with the strategy of 
attacking any governmental or nongovernmental organization that could offer a 
better alternative to the population, thus trying, in essence, to be the population's 
only hope.  
In the annual survey of the ten most powerful men in Peru that DESCO 
Organization printed in its magazine Debate, Guzman rocketed to the top. 
Between 1983 and 1986 he was seventh, and between 1987 and 1990 he was 
fifth. In 1991 he was in fourth place and in the 1992 survey, his name was placed 
in the third spot, behind only President Alberto Fujimori and Prime Minister 
Carlos Boloña.24 
The country’s internal security balance was ambiguous and plagued with 
uncertainty, to the point that either side could access power after a protracted 
war in subsequent years.   
F. HUNTING TERRORIST LEADERS: THE EFFECTS 
Across the large spectrum of organization types, it is noticeable that all 
organizations share a commonality: they are ruled by a leader or a council based 
on some kind of authority. Max Weber points out three kinds of legitimate 
authority: the legal-rational, based on the legality of patterns of normative rules; 
the traditional, based on the established belief in the sanctity of traditions from 
time immemorial; and the charismatic, based on the devotion to the specific and 
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person.25 
From this perspective, gunning for the commander’s head has been a common 
strategic mission in regular and irregular warfare since human organizations first 
started to fight each other. Similarly, counterterrorist policies have aimed at the 
head of the terrorist organization, logically thinking that this would disrupt the 
                                            
23 Strong, 203. 
24 Revista Debate, El Poder en el Perú. (Power in Peru) (Lima: DESCO, 1983 1992). 
25 Max Weber, Selections from His Work, (New York: Thomas Crowell Co, 1966), 63. 
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organization and in consequence stop or diminish terrorist attacks the quickest. 
However, results may vary depending on a series of variables and 
characteristics.  
1. Effects of Targeting Terrorist Leaders 
Langdon, Sarapu and Wells carried out an investigation on this topic, 
discussing the future of terrorist organizations when their leaders had a disease 
or died of old age, were killed, or were arrested. According to the authors’ 
propositions, the groups have four choices determining the group’s survivability 
or evolution: to disband, schism, become more radical, or remain unchanged. 
The variables the authors suggest for determining the level of group resilience 
during a leadership crisis are a strong ideology, a hierarchical structure, and 
popular support.26 
Based on the thirty-one cases they studied, Langdon, Sarapu and Wells 
conclude that the terrorist organization would survive if the leader was captured. 
SL is an exception to this conclusion. In the SL, case, Guzman was not only 
charismatic, but also the designer of "Gonzalo Thought," an approach integrating 
prior communist ideologists that ultimately only Guzman could interpret.  
2. Charismatic Leadership 
The term charisma is often used in political science and sociology to 
describe a subset of leaders who by the force of their personal abilities are 
capable of having profound and extraordinary effects on followers. Followers 
perceive the charismatic leader as one who possesses superhuman qualities and 
accept unconditionally the leader’s mission and directives to action. These 
leaders represent revolutionary social forces, and they are responsible for 
significant societal transformations.27 Charismatic leadership is also referred to 
                                            
26 Lisa Langdon, Alexander Sarapu and Matthew Wells, “Targeting the Leadership of 
Terrorist and Insurgent Movements: Historical Lessons for Contemporary Policy Makers,” Journal 
of Public and International Affairs, Vol. 15 (Spring 2004): 59, 
http://www.princeton.edu/~jpia/pdf2004/Chapter%204.pdf. Accessed June 3, 2005. 
27 Jay Conger and Rabindra Kanungo, "Toward a Behavioral Theory of Charismatic 
Leadership in Organizational Settings," The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 12, no. 4 
(October 1987): 637, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0363-
7425%28198710%2912%3A4%3C637%3ATABTOC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X. Accessed March 2, 
2005. 
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as transformational, visionary or inspirational; it transforms the needs, values, 
preferences and aspirations of followers from self-interests to collective interests. 
Leadership theories emphasize symbolic leader behavior, visionary and 
inspirational messages, nonverbal communication, appeals to ideological values, 
intellectual stimulation of followers by the leader, displays of confidence in self 
and followers, and leader expectations for follower self-sacrifice and for 
performance beyond the call of duty.28 This tradeoff between leader and follower 
under charismatic authority downplays material incentives and centralizes the 
responsibilities of management in the person of the leader.  On the one side, the 
basis of charismatic leadership is the leader, but on the other side, there is an 
interplay between the leader’s attributes and the needs, beliefs, values, and 
perceptions of his or her followers.29 
3. Sendero and Its Charismatic Leader 
Guzman constructed SL’s ideology as the actualization of Marxism, 
Leninism and Maoism, calling it "Gonzalo Thought," wherein he resolved the 
flaws of these ideologies and adapted the ideas to the Peruvian reality, creating 
the most orthodox communism. Acknowledging the deep racial conflicts inside 
Peruvian society, Guzman proposed a class struggle that involved the petit 
bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the peasantry in spite of the racial issues.  Using 
this concept, SL was able to recruit militants from all social classes, with the 
exception of the upper class, and was able to handle the possibility of infiltrating 
different organizations as happened later during the struggle as well.  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, SL began politically in 1970, and 
militarily in 1980. From the very beginning, Guzman organized a strong political 
apparatus around himself that would later rule the revolutionary army following 
Mao’s precept that “the party rules the rifle.” However, due to the underground 
                                            
28 Boas Shamir, Robert J. House and Michael B. Arthur, "The Motivational Effects of 
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and secret organization, means of communication were scarce and dangerous, 
so Guzman had to develop a rigid and authoritarian command.  
According to SL ideology, as the ultimate communists they rejected any 
ties with the Soviet Union, because “we cannot be in any way united to the most 
sinister center of contemporary revisionism, which made the motherland of Lenin 
and Stalin into today’s hegemonic power.”30 They rejected as well any ties with 
the Chinese government, as “yesterday’s enemies of Deng Xiaoping and today 
his adorers can do no less than attack us for combating the Yankee social 
imperialism of their new master and, more seriously, for applying the Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism that they invoked yesterday and today renounce.”31 They 
rejected also the Peruvian legal left that participated in the political context 
established by the “old state.” The war was against everybody who would not 
serve under Guzman’s precepts, even non-state organizations that worked on 
behalf of the populace. This attitude was demonstrated by the SL attacks on 
development projects as Wayllapampa and Allpachaka, both supported by state 
and foreign aid programs and oriented to the improvement of agricultural and 
cattle raising techniques.  
Sendero Luminoso's evolution was marked by the transformation from a 
communist organization into a fundamentalist one. Militants had to renounce 
everything they had and embrace the party. All ties with their old lives had to be 
broken.  They received a new identity, they couldn’t visit relatives or they would 
be charged with liberalism, and they had even to turn in their relatives who were 
state servants to the Party justice apparatus.  
Guzman found in the precepts of Stalin and Mao the tools to “purify” the 
party and remain in power alone. Criticism and self-criticism were used as a kind 
of feedback after the operations, but the peculiarity was that when an issue 
arose, the deciding word came from the leader, no matter what the opinion of the 
Central Committee. Self-criticism was used as well to get rid of potential leaders 
                                            
30 Abimael Guzman, “Let Us Develop the Guerrilla War,” quoted in Gustavo Gorriti, The 
Shining Path (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 174. 
31 Ibid., 176. 
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who could dispute or argue against Guzman’s supremacy. As early as 1982, a 
clear example was seen in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Huamanga 
jail, which ended in an SL victory but in Guzman’s eyes was plagued by 
mistakes. After a process of criticism and self-criticism, the hero of the day, 
Comrade Cesar, was confronted with the responsibility for the support units 
which were also under scrutiny. After twenty-one days of conversations, Guzman 
doomed the five military leaders to begin the process of self-criticism, which 
included accepting all that had been blamed on them and reaffirming their ties to 
the guiding thought and to the party.  But all were demoted, anyway. However, 
the main objective was accomplished: Guzman was confirmed as the only 
dominant power and the only one who wasn’t suitable for the process of self-
criticism. Among the symbols used by SL to represent good and evil, red and 
black, their main symbol was Guzman himself, characterized as the Puka Inti or 
Red Sun, the “guarantee of success for the revolution.” Guzman had 
concentrated all the organization's powers in his own person; he was the 
ideology mentor, the party political leader, and the Revolutionary People’s Army 
chief. Loyalty commitment of the militants were not made to the party but to 
Guzman himself, placing him, according to SL publications, as the “fourth sword 
of Communism,” after "Mao’s Thought" was promoted to Maoism and Guzman’s 
interpretations were considered “Gonzalo’s Thought.”  
Militants had to sign a membership letter acknowledging the supremacy of 
Guzman as the head of the organization and the compromise of the “quota,”32 
understanding the necessity of giving their own lives at Guzman’s order and for 
the party. During the Fourth Plenary Session in May 1981, the concern was to 
make war the main issue for the Peruvian population, thus increasing the 
violence. To meet this objective, the militants had to be convinced of two things: 
                                            
32 J. Bowyer Bell, “Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground,” 
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the need to kill in a systematic and depersonalized way, and the expectation of 
giving up their own lives.33 
4. Sendero’s Last Revolutionary Stage 
SL’s strategy was broken into five phases after 1980: (1) agitation and 
armed propaganda, (2) the opening campaign against Peru’s socioeconomic 
system, (3) the generalization of the guerrilla struggle, (4) the conquest and 
expansion of the movement’s support base and the strengthening of the guerrilla 
army, and (5) general civil war, the siege of the cities, and the final collapse of 
state power.34 The final stage would establish the "Republic of New Democracy." 
However, the conditions for operating in the city were very different than in the 
countryside, even though Guzman had quite successfully led the organization 
from safe houses in Lima because of the centrality of the capital city and his 
high-altitude related illness.35  In May 1991, Guzman decided that SL had 
reached the "strategic equilibrium" and began the "maneuvers war."36 
Guzman proposed Mao’s concept of popular war with a modification:  the 
cities were important not only for the final assault, but during the whole struggle. 
The countryside would be the main scenario and the cities the necessary 
complement.37 The strangling of the cities from the Sierra was based on the main 
Peruvian cities' dependence on countryside resources, with the ultimate objective 
of reaching the capital city, Lima, the economic and social center of the country 
which depended on the food, energy, and water of the countryside.38 
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To this end, energy plants were infiltrated in the low- and mid-levels to 
recognize and gather information about the most sensitive spots in the energy 
network.  These infiltrations allowed SL to plan precise bombings, provoking long 
electrical blackouts in the cities. The weapons the militants handled were not 
abundant, but their transport system was effective. Weapons could be 
transported throughout the country to attack distant targets in very little time. 
Tracking suspects in the countryside was quite difficult for the authorities, as the 
peasants would not cooperate and any stranger's presence was immediately 
noted.39 Yet all these conditions would play against the revolution in the cities. 
Furthermore, when SL attacked the police in the countryside, it forced them to 
retreat back to the cities where all the political and military power was 
concentrated and the police were playing on their own field. Citizens would 
realize that the war was not only for the indios and serranos, but for the whole 
country.  
G. COUNTERTERRORIST EFFORTS 
President Fernando Belaunde’s administration (1980-1985) didn’t identify 
the insurgency immediately at the beginning of its term. Once they realized an 
insurgency was under way, they sent the police to control it, underestimating the 
insurgents' strength in the countryside and overestimating police capabilities and 
resources in that operational environment. The net result was an increase of 
attacks in that period, the retreat of police units from the countryside to the cities, 
and the designation of the armed forces to solve the problem in 1982.  The 
military approach that the armed forces had used to defeat the foco type 
guerrillas of 1965, combined with use of the government-granted political and 
military control of the insurgency areas, led to a repressive strategy. The result of 
this new approach was an initial drop in the terrorists' open actions, but an 
increasing hatred of the military units and an increase of terrorist actions in other 
areas of the country to which the insurgents had been pushed. The military 
approach continued even when Garcia took office (1985-1990) after his heavily-
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loaded social campaign. During this period the Rondas Campesinas40 were 
reinstalled, but without weapons. The net result of this period was again an 
increase in terrorist attacks, and even stronger disapproval of the military 
methods that human rights organizations denounced repeatedly in international 
forums. In 1990 Fujimori took office and took a multi-approach strategy, backed 
by the military. The administration enhanced the intelligence apparatus, the legal 
aspects, and the Rondas Campesinas systems, replacing the necessity of 
stationing troops in distant villages. The government implemented a civic action 
program to change the population's ideas about the military and to make them 
more cooperative.  
H. CONCLUSIONS 
The Shining Path organization was present long before it was recognized 
and attacked by the state. The organization was politically active since the 
1970s, strengthening their ideological basis and setting the basis for a protracted 
war that would start at Guzman's command. As the developer of Gonzalo 
Thought, also called "Guidance Thought," Guzman was the only leader of the 
party's political bureau and the Revolutionary Army, the deciding vote on any 
party issue, and the only interpreter of Marx, Lenin, and Mao. Even when he 
could not be physically present in the Sierra heights where the battles were 
fought, he managed to establish an effective and secure communication system 
to spread his orders and receive feedback from the countryside leaders while he 
waited in safe houses in Lima and the media remained uncertain about his 
location or even if he was still alive. The SL's compartmentalized organization 
enabled him to gather with his political and military subordinates in the suburbs in 
Lima with adequate security.  
Political, economic and social conditions in the country helped Guzman to 
decide the right moment to start the revolution and exploit the state's inefficiency 
in delivering goods, or what the Shining Path called “contradictions.” The state 
felt itself caught in the trap presented by the insurgent strategy of seeking a 
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violent response which resulted in more SL recruits, sharpened the 
contradictions, and condemned the state in the international arena for human 
rights violations. However, Guzman’s decision to move forward to the last stage 
of revolution is arguable. As discussed earlier in this chapter, urban areas 
presented harder challenges to SL. 
Previous Peruvian governments tried different approaches with no 
success. The Fujimori administration tried a more complete approach, improving 
the military intelligence agencies and linking them with the National Intelligence 
System.  There were positive results, with the capture of the insurgent military 
apparatus which, however, was easier for SL to replace. Rare hits were delivered 
to the political apparatus, the foundation of SL strength. Early achievements in 
locating Guzman’s safe houses (but not capturing him) were effectively exploited 
by insurgent propaganda to project the image of Guzman as an invincible leader 
who could escape any state effort to capture him and would inevitably reach 
power. The government institutions and representatives were losing a political 





III. THE SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP 
The National Counter Terrorism Directorate (DINCOTE) had its initial 
stages at the beginning of 1981, when, in response to the increasing terrorist 
attacks in Lima, a division of the State Security Directorate was created with the 
name of Counter Subversion Division. The division started to work with little 
support from the hierarchy.  The only facility for the unit was an office that 
functioned as the headquarters, the communication and analysis center, the 
operations center and even the detainee center. During this period, the division 
concentrated on understanding the terrorist movement, analyzing seized 
material, and sketching suspects. They then attained the level of Directorate, the 
same level as State Security. During 1982, DINCOTE carried out some 
significant arrests but only of people in the SL military's middle level. The lack of 
intelligence and the fact that they could act only when a crime had already been 
committed prevented them from climbing any higher in the terrorist 
organization.41 
In 1991, DINCOTE was reorganized and separate units were created at 
the police regions level, independent of their regional commands.42 This enabled 
the decentralized commanders in the field to report directly to the headquarters in 
Lima and inform the middle bureaucracy at the same time, thus improving the 
speed of information flow within the directorate. As happens frequently in state 
organizations, they grow up but their budgets do not. Agents were working in 
adverse conditions and the directorate had to ask for private support from the 
Association of Peruvian Entrepreneurs; eventually, an extraordinary budget from 
the state was designated to tackle their modernization.  
National Counter Terrorism Director General Antonio Vidal's main idea 
was to change the image in the media of SL as a criminal organization into the 
image of SL as an organization looking for power, with Guzman harboring a 
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political intention and an ideology. Vidal’s intention was to use media as allies in 
the war against terrorism in Peru.  
Since the origin of SL, service in state security (and later, in DINCOTE) 
was among the least-coveted fates for those working for the Investigations 
Police.  The reason was simple: nobody could make money in security 
deployments.43 The ranks of state security were filled with officers who were 
rejected from other, more desirable units, and had no other opportunities.  In 
1991, approximately 90% of them were removed, and new personnel were 
assigned to the cases.  Police officers that were to present the captured terrorists 
on TV were ordered to dress in suits and present a sharp look in order to change 
public opinion about the police and to heighten the contrast between what the 
state represented (a sharply-dressed, clean officer) and what SL represented (a 
dirty, aggressive criminal). DINCOTE units in Lima were divided again, going 
from eight delta teams with the mission of persecuting the terrorist organizations, 
into five delta units and five intelligence units. One of them was the Special 
Intelligence Group. In addition, there was a unit in charge of criminals who used 
the terrorists’ reputation to conduct hijackings and ask for ransom.44 
A. DELTA GROUPS AND INTELLIGENCE GROUPS 
The five intelligence groups were assigned to gather and analyze 
information about the various level terrorists of both terrorist groups, the Shining 
Path and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which was also 
operating in the area but without a connection to SL. They were assigned 
geographically within the area of Lima. After sufficient intelligence was put 
together, the delta groups were informed so they could seize the installations, 
capture the suspects, and build the criminal case. After every attack they went to 
the location to gather information and clues that might help the analysts to find 
out which group was responsible and eventually to build a criminal accusation 
that the prosecutor could present against the suspects. 
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Chiefs of every group met with the director daily to share information on a 
“need to know” basis and to plan possible joint future operations.45  
B. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP 
In 1990, the Chief of Investigations Police General PNP Fernando Reyes 
appointed Commander PNP Benedicto Jimenez, who had been working in the 
directorate for eight years, with his final assignment:  to be commander of Delta 
Group 5, a unit specializing in the capture of SL’s leaders. For this purpose 
Jimenez was authorized to ask for the necessary personnel from the directorate. 
Jimenez started with a captain, two ensigns, and a corporal from the police, and 
a navy intelligence NCO, and ended up in 1993 with eighty-two agents, including 
three women. The unit was supposed to report to the DINCOTE director 
according to the formal chain of command, but it reported directly to the Police 
Investigations Chief General Fernando Reyes.46 
1. Mission 
DINCOTE had oriented its efforts toward attacking the SL and MRTA at 
different levels. SIG was assigned to hit SL leaders specifically. Several strikes 
were made against the organization, capturing guns, explosives, and low-level 
military cadre in the Revolutionary Army (these were replaced almost 
immediately by the party). SIG leaders realized that flashy captures worked very 
well for media purposes, but terrorist activities were not decreasing.  These 
captures were used by the state to send the wrong signals of success to the 
public.  But SL could rapidly recruit more militants to replace their losses; so if the 
intention was to inflict critical damage on the organization, SIG leaders realized 
they must aim at the party leaders. Apart from SIG, there were other intelligence 
units within DINCOTE or the other services going after the political leaders.  The 
methods used by other units included following the tracks of identified political 
leaders' relatives to reach the leaders, using the evidence discovered at attack 
locations.  Other methods included the infiltration, or attempted infiltration, of the 
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terrorists' ranks. In the first instance, the units encountered the obstacle that the 
terrorist leaders had renounced their family ties in order to embrace the party 
(see Chapter II); in the second instance, SL’s compartmentalization and cell 
structure isolated the cadres from the operatives, and the fact that SL upper-level 
members served ten or fifteen years in the organization stymied the attempts to 
infiltrate at high levels. In addition, another method that failed was the use of 
informants, who turned out to be nonexistent at higher levels of the hierarchy. 
SIG decided to pursue patient vigilance of cadres that were let out of jail, or of 
other identified cadre who might reveal their links to the leaders. 
The newborn unit tried to start with a complete knowledge of the enemy;  
they patiently studied all documentation and publications distributed by SL or 
captured by the police in order to predict SL’s trends.  Based on their 
investigations, they concluded that SL had a formal organization based on the 
party, the army, and the front, and that their activities were not a result of 
improvisation but were systematic, planned and oriented to destroying the 
democratic establishment with a solid ideology that gave the terrorists the moral 
support necessary to legitimate their criminal actions.47 
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Figure 1.   Special Intelligence Unit Organizational Chart. 
 
Overview of organization and functions 
Commander (Commander Marcos Miyashiro):  
Responsible for the Group to the upper level 
Capability to take decisions on his level 
 
Executive Officer (Commander Benedicto Jimenez): 
Also Chief of Operations 





Two offices functioned in the Technical Support Department: the Devices 
Support Office, in charge of developing the necessary devices for the 
Surveillance Units to perform undercover, and the Systems Support Office, in 
charge of the computers. 
 
School: 
In charge of the incremental development of the agents’ capabilities in the 
different intelligence techniques according to their requirements 
 
Logistics: 
In charge of the supplies. This task required permanent communication 
with the DINCOTE Executive Officer as a supply liaison.  
 
Office of Strategic Analysis: 
In charge of the analysis and establishment of relations between the 
conclusions of the Operative Analysis office, previous operations, other units' 
known operations, and the strategic situation 
 
Office of Operative Analysis: 
In charge of the analysis of the information brought by the Surveillance 
Units pertaining to a specific case 
 
Surveillance Units 
In charge of the observation, vigilance, and surveillance of the targets. 
Their number varied depending on the number of targets they had to observe 
3. Recruiting 
The first agents that joined the group were people who had worked   for 
Commanders Miyashiro and Jimenez in their former units. The police's situation 
required that the recruitment process and selection be extremely careful. The 
threat of infiltration was high, and the moral and ethical values that the agents 
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needed had to be balanced with the capabilities necessary to enhance the 
group's performance. 
As SIG discovered the terrorist network, they needed more surveillance 
units in order to keep the suspects under watch and more administrative 
personnel to support them. The recruitment process had several steps. First the 
potential agents were recommended by group members, who accepted a degree 
of responsibility for the people they proposed; no volunteers were accepted. 
Potential agents were then asked if they agreed to join SIG. If the answer was 
affirmative, they took a psychological test to prove their mental stability and were 
evaluated in their skills by a board consisting of senior officers from O3 to O5. 
Finally, the senior members performed a counter-check on the candidates to find 
anything suspicious that might be not in the previously-presented paperwork. 
After that they attended the SIG School. The command avoided deploying 
personnel already working in SIG to other units, expanding only with new 
recruits. Most of their knowledge was acquired by experience, so giving people 
away would be a waste of invested time and effort.48 Considering that an 
operator will perform better in the tasks he perceives as more attractive and for 
which he has more relevant skills, the agents were classified again and assigned 
to their jobs accordingly.  
4. Training 
After selection, the officers and agents attended three weeks of training in 
the facilities of SIG and were assigned immediately to the surveillance units for a 
practice period. Most of the trainees came from the former Investigations Police 
School, where they learned the basics of police activities.  Then the SIG School   
reinforced that instruction and taught them specific procedures. The in-class 
period, as a complement to their previous studies in the Police Academy, 
consisted of indoctrination in democratic values, terrorism ideology, police-critical 
procedures, human behavior observation, communications, documents analysis, 
and camouflage. According to the interviewed officers, the main part of the 
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acquisition of knowledge process was in the field. Trainees in surveillance teams 
were assigned to different jobs but not permitted to lead the unit, no matter how 
great their seniority. In this case, experience in the field was preferable to rank. 
After experience was acquired, officers were assigned according to their ranks.  
From 1990 on, the school received assistance from specialists from the 
American Embassy in Lima in the areas of cover and camouflage49 Techniques 
of surveillance were taught in accordance with the Peruvian National Police 
doctrine. In the field, learning was a long trial and error process.  Complementary 
training was prepared according to the needs of the agents and the weaknesses 
revealed in the field and the offices. As soon as a fault in surveillance was 
detected, if it was due to lack of training, the agent had to attend the school; if it 
was due to lack of skills, the agent was reassigned to another job in the 
organization. The SIG leaders held the idea that if a man had integrity, they could 
find a job for him in the unit and train him to perform satisfactorily.    
In the SIG school and afterwards, while working in the field, agents were 
indoctrinated in liberty, justice, respect for human life, and protection of 
democracy; the main values of the Method of Operative Intelligence.50 
5. Chain of Command 
In 1990, when the Chief of Police Investigations appointed Commander 
Jimenez to start the group, the intention was that Jimenez would report directly to 
the Chief. However, his immediate formal chain of command was the DINCOTE 
director.  
Within the group, the units under the Commander and Executive Officer 
reported directly to either one, sometimes skipping echelons to achieve greater 
speed in the flow of information.51  
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There was a unique factor that helped SIG in the leaders’ relations with 
the upper echelons: Commander Miyashiro was a close friend of Santiago 
Fujimori, President Fujimori’s brother and advisor, as they both belonged to the 
Nisei community in Peru. Santiago Fujimori was not involved with the group’s 
issues, but he served as a protector when needed. Earlier, the same role had 
been played by police chief General Reyes Roca, up until his retirement.   
6. Operational Security 
The operations office assigned nicknames every fifteen days to the agents 
to keep their real identities out of the communications. At the time, this procedure 
was very common within armed forces and police units in emergency zones.  
In order to keep the agents' profiles low, agents who belonged to the 
surveillance teams did not go to the headquarters.  They reported only by radio 
communication and used messenger agents to receive supplies and deliver 
written reports. In addition, the surveillance teams worked only for two hours 
shifts, and if the target was extremely alert, they could only observe it for an hour 
(depending on the availability of personnel). The command periodically ordered 
random counter-checks on every individual working for the SIG. In addition, SIG 
personnel were not involved with presentation of the captured terrorists to the 
media; other DINCOTE agents did that, and announced the captures simply as 
DINCOTE achievements. The use of high technology devices to track suspects 
was limited.  Even when the American embassy could provide them, it was not 
possible to use them in the neighborhoods where the mid-level cadres operated. 
Most of them lived in the hills surrounding Lima, in areas which presented very 
few communication possibilities. For this reason, the agents often lost track of the 
terrorists and had to wait until a lost target made contact with another observed 
target or until the target was found again in one of his habitual locations.  
There were three criteria behind the decision to finish an operation: first, if 
the surveillance teams were discovered and the targets could pass the word to 
their cell directors and flee; second, when the operation was three months old 
and the operation became unstable and logistically difficult for SIG; and third, 
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when the whole cell direction was discovered or did not lead to new targets.52 In 
order to achieve surprise, SIG planned the captures for weekends or holidays, 
because the targets would not expect police agents to work on those days.  
7. Obstacles 
Quality of personnel: As discussed in Chapter II, the quality of personnel 
in the police units was quite poor. Most police officers were looking for safe desk 
jobs and the chance of another job part time, or for a deployment that would earn 
more income. Those who ended up in the DINCOTE ranks were the officers who 
could not get a better job or a recommendation from someone powerful in the 
government or the police; they had little or no interest in staying in the police 
service other than to earn a living. The directorate offered only low paid and 
dangerous jobs. Officers in the counterterrorist units were often identified and 
threatened by terrorist cells; some were kidnapped or murdered. 
In the cities, because of their low income police officers lived in police 
villages if they could afford them, or in poor neighborhoods in the city.  In either 
case, their neighbors rejected them because were permanent targets for the 
terrorists, whose bullets and bombs might reach the surrounding houses as well.  
Infiltration: In ten years of struggle, SL had managed to infiltrate public 
organizations, like electrical companies and mining companies, to extract 
valuable information for their attacks. Law enforcement units and the armed 
forces were no exception. As early as 1981, a soldier in Ayacucho was arrested 
by the police when he was discovered to have SL pamphlets and a number of 
dynamite sticks in his house. Later the same year, a navy crewman at the Callao 
navy base deserted, taking with him several rifles.53 There was even a woman 
named Eva Gomez (aka Comrade Mariana) who infiltrated as a psychologist in 
charge of the treatment of police officers who had just returned from the 
emergency zones with post-combat trauma symptoms. She was the romantic 
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partner of Deodato Juarez, SL chief of propaganda who was, until his capture, 
considered by some observers the only accepted successor to Guzman.54 
Reward: The 1.5 million dollar reward for the capture of Guzman offered 
by the government with the sponsorship of private companies attracted several 
private adventurers and even inspired in other state agencies the hope of 
collecting it.55 The adventurers sometimes had better electronic equipment for 
communications interception and could take advantage of SIG surveillance by 
tracking their communications. The agents used their communications codes for 
people and places, and sometimes even planned two or three alternate plans to 
send their followers to different locations and identify them.56 
On the other hand, the reward had the positive outcome of increasing the 
general public's participation. Besides the reward for Guzman’s head, there were 
rewards for the identified cadres.  These were highly publicized, and 
consequently, terrorist activities were driven even more underground in the face 
of civilians eager to bring information to the government that would earn them 
reward money.  
Lack of intelligence sharing: As with intelligence units generally, those in 
Peru, motivated by professional jealousies and hunger for individual success, did 
not share vital information. Each branch of service in the armed forces had an 
intelligence directorate that reported to their commands and, since 1990, to the 
empowered National Intelligence Service (SIN). The sharing of information was 
encouraged by national strategy makers but the agencies were afraid of 
leakages. In an effort to get SIG information, the powerful National Intelligence 
Service opened up an office in the SIG facility with the excuse that it was 
developing a new doctrine for Army units operating nation wide. Furthermore, 
Commander Jimenez was appointed liaison officer between DINCOTE and SIN, 
and was called in frequently to conduct conferences and briefings.  
                                            
54 Quechua, 532. 
55 It was not clear if the reward would be awarded if a state agency carried out the capture. 
56 Colonel PNP (r) Benedicto Jimenez, interview by author, tape recording, Lima, Peru, 
August 13, 2005.  
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Political interference: Due to the important impacts of SIG achievements, 
political patrons expected to take advantage of them in the political arena. In April 
1992, the President had dismissed the Congress, arguing that it was an obstacle 
to his counterterrorism policy.  Even with the Congress closed and new laws in 
action, terrorist actions increased. In addition, there was permanent pressure on 
SIG to achieve results. The fear of SIG leaders was that politicians would release 
important information if the “political moment” was propitious, thus taking down a 
ongoing larger operation.  
8. Method of Operative Intelligence 
To make patience an art and waiting a virtue.57 
At the beginning, SIG operated in the traditional way inherited from its 
DINCOTE and delta ancestors. Two events, both consequences of their first 
successful operation, pushed SIG to develop its own method. (SIG's main 
operations will be discussed later in this chapter.)  The first event was the 
frustration caused by the delta groups' inability to build criminal cases after the 
SIG work had concluded. The second event was the disappointment when 
Operation Caballero was about to end with the seizure of a safe house, and it 
turned out that no cadre was inside, apparently because information about the 
raid had been leaked.  That time a delta unit had been informed of the operation 
in order to collaborate with SIG.58 
The "method of operative intelligence" (MOI) was built to fight organized 
crime by aiming to dislocate leaders from operatives. The method is carried out 
once suspects have been identified but before a criminal act has occurred. It 
consists of combining intelligence with the criminal investigation carried out within 
a single unit. According to traditional procedures, these should not be combined 
for security purposes. The objective of the intelligence phase is to gather as 
much data as possible before the terrorist crime is committed; then, during the 
                                            
57 Benedicto Jimenez, Doctrina y Ciencia Policial (Doctrine and Police Science) (Lima, 
2003), 156. 
58 Jimenez, Inicio, Desarrollo y Ocaso del Terrorismo en el Peru, 714. 
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criminal investigation phase, the circumstances and judgments are established 
and the criminal accusation is prepared for the prosecutor’s office.59 
The process has two phases: intelligence and criminal investigation. The 
intelligence phase starts with the identification of mid-level targets, location, and 
assignment of a surveillance team suitable for the target’s characteristics. 
Because there is no criminal action yet, the target may be simply a suspect 
mentioned by other mid-level militants or a militant recently released from jail. 
The team observes its target 24 hours a day until his or her routine is 
established, after which they observe the target during his hours of activity. At 
this time, the structure of the target organization begins to take shape. The job is 
difficult because at this level there are no informers if the target is lost, and 
targets are trained to take all kinds of safety precautions to lose their tails. The 
agents camouflage themselves as ice cream sellers, street retailers, lovers, trash 
collectors, etc. In SIG’s the task was made more difficult because the terrorists 
used to act in the marginal neighborhoods of Lima where some technological 
devices would not work, requiring that the agents had use their knowledge and 
creativity to follow, reach, and observe the targets.  
Typically, the operational analysis office prefers a tape or video recording 
whenever possible. To this end, the office of technical devices provided SIG with 
ingenious homemade gadgets. If tapes or video recordings were not possible, 
simple observation was needed. Special attention was paid to the suspects’ body 
language and superior-subordinate behavior to establish their positions in the 
hierarchy and their value. Afterwards, each member of the surveillance team had 
to deliver a complete report, even if the team had been working together the 
whole time, in order to not miss any detail or observation.  The report was 
analyzed in conjunction with the reports of other surveillance teams working on 
the same case, producing a report for the strategic analysis office that 
established relations with other current and prior cases and also producing a 
recommendation to the commander and executive officer of whether to take 
                                            
59 Jimenez, Doctrina y Ciencia Policial, 155. 
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down the cell--or not. Once the suspects were apprehended, the criminal 
investigation began and the surveillance teams went back to their observation 
job. By law, the SIG had fifteen days to interrogate suspects to gather more 
information, but with the advantage of having already collected evidence for 
prosecution during the surveillance period. Evidence was picked up from the 
sites and a report prepared for the prosecutor. The method was improved based 
on constructive criticism after each operation in which higher leaders were 
captured, a process which in turn led to interest by those authorities who 
accompanied the economic support from the government and the American 
embassy.60 
9. Main Operations 
SIG carried out a total of ten operations (listed in the Appendix). Each 
operation was debriefed and used as a learning experience for the next.  
a. Operation Isa, March 5 to June 1, 1990 
A safe house that had functioned since 1987 as the Organization 
Support Department (DAO) and the Party Support Group (GAP) headed, 
respectively, by Elvia Zanabria (aka Juana) and Carlos Torres (aka David), was 
taken. This was the second-most important house at the time. The house was 
located in a neighborhood built during the military government for army officers, 
most of whom at the time were retired but had military security. It was ten blocks 
away from the Army general headquarters. The search agents found a list of 
codenames, phone numbers and addresses of the central committees’ leaders 
and the main staff hidden in Zanabria’s books. The house served as a link 
between the Central Department located in the Buenavista safe house 
(discovered a year later) and the heads of the party committees.  This 
information was the key for subsequent SIG operations. Operation Isa allowed 
SIG to conclude that Guzman was alive and ruling the party and that the central 
committees only followed orders. This is supposedly the first time that Guzman 
escaped. The operation was coordinated with a delta unit from DINCOTE; 
presumably there was a leak of information enabling Guzman to escape. 
                                            
60 Colonel PNP (r) Benedicto Jimenez, interview by author, tape recording, Lima, Peru, 
August 13, 2005.  
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However, in this operation thirty houses are seized and forty terrorists captured.61 
SIG agents made their way in when one of the terrorists, playing the role of a 
maid, opened the garage door. Armed resistance in this kind of safe house was 
nonexistent; these locations were used only as political sites.  
b. Operation Caballero, October 2, 1990 to January 31, 
1991 
SIG seized Natividad Mendez’s apartment and the safe house 
located on Buenavista Street. The agents found videos of Guzman performing a 
"Zorba the Greek" dance filmed in June 1989, along with several party 
documents. The footage was presented to the media and used as a 
psychological operation, as it showed Guzman drunk and dancing with several 
party leaders. Also captured in this operation was Nelly Evans, a former nun 
turned terrorist leader. Guzman had been living in this house since 1989, but 
Angelica Salas, a member of the central committee, had observed the agents on 
January 28 and managed to take Guzman and Iparraguirre, Guzman’s romantic 
partner, to another safe house. With the video, the police could identify the 
central committee. Before it was not clear what Guzman looked like, or how 
many served on the central committee and their identities.  
10. SIG’s Organizational Characteristics 
SIG final performances resulted from a progressive evolution during a 
three-year trial and error process. The Peruvian police are organized in a military 
fashion nationwide; however, the former Investigations Police, where most of SIG 
members came from, had a more flexible organization. That prior organizational 
experience provided the starting point for Jimenez in building the unit. DINCOTE 
procedures mandated working in coordination with delta groups for the operative 
part of the process, following strict procedures to get permission to hit terrorist 
cells, and reporting any progress in their tasks, but these procedures had been 
used for years with poor results. 
Mintzberg classifies the coordination mechanisms in organizations into six 
types: the simple structure characterized by direct supervision, the machine 
                                            
61 Benedicto Jimenez, Inicio, Desarrollo y Ocaso del Terrorismo en el Peru, 714. 
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bureaucracy where standardization of work prevails, the professional 
bureaucracy dominated by the standardization of skills, the adhocracy relying on 
mutual adjustment, the divisional form with its standardization of outputs, and 
finally the missionary, relying on the standardization of norms or ideology.62  
Mintzberg states that the “pure missionary is built around an inspiring 
mission--to change society in some way, or to change the organization’s own 
members, or just to provide them with a unique experience--an accompanying 
set of beliefs and norms.”63 In every organization, all coordination mechanisms 
are present to some degree, but one (and sometimes two) prevails, generating a 
hybrid organization.64 Using this frame of reference, SIG can be placed within the 
organizational span. SIG was a unit inside the police and had to maintain a level 
of standardization, so the group became a professional bureaucracy in a sense. 
However, the SIG executive officer took advantage of the organization's newness 
to establish a fresh set of procedures (the method of operative intelligence). 
Jimenez set up the organization with the commander’s and his own reputation as 
backup and example; their strong leadership organized the group in a simple 
structure. Miyashiro and Jimenez would be there any time an agent or an analyst 
intended to report something, or a decision had to be made, no matter the time or 
the day. Jimenez would even resolve personal issues among agents, personally 
calling them to his office and clarifying issues in his own particular way. In 
addition, no birthday or personal problem was overlooked by the commanders.65 
As Mintzberg noted, the grouping should be in relatively small units because 
personal contact is the only way to maintain strong ideology.66 SIG grew to only 
82 members, most of them in the surveillance teams, leaving the offices with only 
the minimum number of people required.  If necessary, office agents collaborated 
                                            
62 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?,” Harvard Business Review 
(January-February 1981): 5-11.  
63 Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993), 294. 
64 Class Notes, Professor Erick Jansen, Organizational Design, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, September 2004. 
65 Major PNP Ruben Zuñiga, interview by author, tape recording, Lima, Peru, August 12, 
2005.  
66 Mintzberg, 295. 
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in the field as well. Technical and administrative support was kept to the 
minimum necessary. Inside SIG, a culture grew where loyalty was paid to SIG 
leaders and peers only, regardless of the fact that they belonged to the police 
organization in first instance. The level of responsibility was necessarily very 
high, especially in the surveillance teams who performed their tasks in groups of 
two or three, away from the bosses’ supervision and reporting only by radio. 
Meanwhile, the tasks performed by the operating core, the surveillance groups, 
were highly specialized; agents performed only a narrow range of tasks. Through 
periodic attendance at SIG school the leaders indoctrinated the rank and file with 
the values of liberty, justice, respect for human life, and protection of democracy, 
giving the agents a sense of mission67 and unity that made them feel different 
from the rest of the institution which was being so heavily criticized at the time. 
The agents felt that they were working not only in the correct way, but also that 
the outcome of their work would have national consequences.  In other words, 
the political future of the country was in their hands. Few other rewards were 
offered apart from the sense of doing the right thing. The logistics office would 
provide some money for daily meals and they were granted fifteen days of leave 
after each operation. The economic reward for the capture of Guzman was 
uncertain, since it was not clear if it was available for employees of state 
agencies.  
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The revolutionary development of SL found Peruvian law enforcement and 
military institutions underdeveloped and unexpectedly behind, making it 
necessary for both the police and military  to rush improvements while also 
combating the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement at the 
same time. The implementation of a national police force on paper 
underestimated the particular cultures of the three former institutions that, along 
with the armed forces, intelligence agencies, and the recently empowered  
                                            
67 Mintzberg defines sense of mission as a feeling that the group has banded together to 
create something unusual and exiting, p. 353. 
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National Intelligence System, became competitors in the race for the information 
necessary to succeed and ultimately to gain a larger portion of the national 
budget.  
In the first near-decade of DINCOTE's work, it was able to feed the 
judiciary system with some solid prosecution cases against SL’s military 
apparatus.  However, against the high-level political apparatus, DINCOTE had 
almost no success. With the intention of improving the hunt for SL’s leadership, 
the directorate appointed Commander PNP Jimenez to lead an ad hoc unit 
tasked with this assignment. Jimenez took special care in recruiting and training 
his agents, giving them a reason to perform well.  More importantly, he put into 
practice his method of operative intelligence, oriented not only to building criminal 
cases, but also to finding clues that might lead SIG to higher levels in the SL 
political hierarchy.  
The MOI had several advantages. 
• Much data used to reach conclusions is not recorded in intelligence 
reports. Details from the intelligence section that were discarded or 
summarized for the report are still present in the agents’ minds and 
report scratch notes, and these details can be used to build the 
criminal case, which is prepared by the same agents.  
• The MOI increases operations security because the intelligence-
operations loop is closed. 
• The MOI, because it avoids the use of other units, increases 
autonomy from the superior echelon.  
• The MOI helps to build a solid criminal case. 
• Once a suspect is caught and exposed to enough evidence to be 
prosecuted, the suspect tends to be more cooperative. 
• The MOI decreases the importance of interrogations, which helps 
avoid excessive use of police force. In addition, militants typically 
declined to collaborate in interrogations due to both  Sendero’s 
"Gold Rule" that forbade prisoners from betraying their comrades, 
no matter how the authorities interrogated or tortured them, and the 
“quota,” discussed in Chapter II. 
• The MOI provides easily-retrieved information from the criminal 
investigation phase through the intelligence phase, if needed.  
• Feedback is much more frequent since only one unit is performing. 
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• If only one unit conducts the whole process, surprise and 
opportunity can be maintained. 
Disadvantages of the MOI include the following.  
• It demands too much time and effort.  
• It demands motivated and dedicated personnel. 
• Intelligence personnel can be identified while gathering evidence 
during the criminal investigation.  
With these attributes, SIG was able to conduct a series of successful 
operations with both desired and collateral effects that at last situated them 
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IV. THE CAPTURE 
A. OPERATION VICTORIA 
The operation started In June 1992 and ended with Guzman's capture on 
September 12, 1992. 
After operation Caballero ended, an unidentified man ran as the central 
committee coordinator. He was observed when he met with Luis Arana68 and 
when he went to pick up his children from school (thus violating the “liberalism”69 
rule). To the agent’s surprise, one of the children called him by his name and 
later, with the help of a video surveillance footage, the man was identified as 
Zenon Vargas, a terrorist leader. On April 4, Arana and Vargas met with an 
unidentified man, and all three were picked up by a woman in a red car. On June 
22, Arana was apprehended and declared he did not know the couple, but a 
scratched note of a secret meeting was found in his pocket. The police followed 
the track of the red car's license plate and showed Arana the owner’s picture. 
The owner was Carlos Inchaustegui.   
The police found Inchaustegui and followed him to a house in the Los 
Sauces neighborhood, where he was living with Maritza Garrido-Lecca. 
Surveillance on the house from a neighbor’s rented room began on July 21. It 
appeared that only Inchaustegui and Garrido-Lecca lived in the house. Garrido-
Lecca had established a fake dance school in the living room to disguise her 
activities. The analysts thought that, because the couple had brought Arana to 
Guzman, eventually they would lead the agents to Guzman, too. However, the 
house's security measures were extremely strict.  Every time the couple left the 
house they double-locked the door; every morning and randomly during the day 
Inchaustegui would go to the roof and observe the neighborhood for a while; he 
                                            
68 Luis Arana was the accountant for the Cesar Vallejo Academy, which was used by SL to 
recruit militants and raise money to sustain Guzman in Lima. He had been under SIG surveillance 
for two years already. 
69 SL considered "liberalism" to include visiting relatives once the militants went underground 
and punished it severely. 
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used to leave the house early in the morning, walk around the city, and return in 
the afternoon to  simulate going to work.  
This suspicious activity prompted the agents to get closer. Disguised as 
city employees, they started to collect the trash and analyze it in their 
headquarters. Much evidence appeared in this period:  the couple bought an 
excessive amount of groceries, the amount of discarded trash was quite large for 
just two people, and sometimes there were burned paper in the trash. On one 
occasion agents found a written note about the party congress that was later 
recognized to contain Iparraguirre’s handwriting, but they were not sure yet if 
Guzman was there. On September 11, when Inchaustegui and Garrido-Lecca 
were out and the house was supposedly empty, agents knocked on the door 
insistently, posing as retailers.  Nobody opened the door but a female silhouette 
on the second floor was recorded. That was Elena Iparraguirre.  
The next day, Jimenez ordered the seizure of the house in Los Sauces 
and all other locations related to the operation. Agents “Ardilla” and “Gaviota” 
took advantage of the fact that two friends of Garrido-Lecca were leaving the 
house and the door was open to enter the living room, where they found three 
women. Agent “Ardilla,” who felt somebody was looking at him from upstairs, ran 
up the stairs and kicked the door open.  He then fell into the room, aiming his 38 
special revolver at Guzman’s head while Iparraguirre pulled at “Ardilla’s” hair, 
insulting him and telling him not to shoot. SIG captured four out of five members 
of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee: Abimael Guzman (aka 
Gonzalo), Elena Iparraguirre (aka Miriam), Maria Pantoja (aka Eugenia), and 
Laura Zambrano (aka Rene). The only member of the Central Committee 
missing was Oscar Ramirez (aka Feliciano). In addition, they captured Carlos 
Inchaustegui and Maritza Garrido-Lecca who were in charge of the house. 
B. AFTERMATH AND CONTRIBUTION TO SHINING PATH’S DEFEAT 
The capture of Guzman and its impact on SL’s activity cannot be seen as 
isolated events. At the national level, as explained in Chapter II, since 1990 the 
government had improved the Rondas Campesinas program, thus regaining rural 
ground that SL had disregarded in order to prioritize the battle for the cities. At 
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the same time, the judicial system was restructured, stiffening the punishments 
(up to life sentences) for terrorist criminals and defining them as traitors to the 
homeland.   
At the party level, Guzman was closing the conference of the central 
committee and commanding the next offensive actions for October and 
November. After previous SIG operations, Guzman ordered that there be no 
large single meetings with the Central Committee members at the same time, but 
instead multiple meetings with the leaders divided into groups. On September 12, 
1992, he had already met with most of his cadre and communicated them the 
next steps they were to follow.  
At his public presentation after his capture, Guzman, wearing a striped 
outfit and inside a cage, took advantage of the situation and directed his militants 
to continue the battle, arguing that his arrest was only a curve on the way to 
victory.     
The capture of Guzman represents a strong hit in the psychological arena 
for SL militants who had seen him as the Puka Inti, the Red Sun. The cult of 
personality Guzman built turned against him. In addition, organizationally he had 
concentrated all powers in his own hands.  During central committee meetings 
that were supposed to discuss the party bearing, the cadre was limited to 
repeating Guzman’s sentences and decisions. Guzman taught his militants that 
he was the guarantee of communism's triumph, to the point that he became 
essential for success. At the same time, his image as invulnerable melted away, 
and the state recovered the initiative. The party was built on an ideological 
foundation, but Guzman was the only one who could interpret that ideology.  In 
his public speech after he was captured, he directed the militants to continue the 
struggle, but there was no successor for the period that Guzman was to spend in 
jail, incommunicado and unable to answer the cadre’s questions.  
In addition, during the operations described above, numerous subversive 
documents were confiscated, including plans, lists of militants showing their 
double identities, and statistics of terrorist activities carried out by SL.  
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Confiscation of these documents created a sense of insecurity about how much 
the state knew about the militants. After September 12, 1992, the DINCOTE 
apprehended all individuals related to the case and seized their safe houses.  At 
the time, the SL’s mid-level militants fell into a defensive position.70 
 













































































































Figure 2.   Sendero Luminoso Terrorist Activities by Month: 1991-1995 (From: 
DESCO Organization Archives). 
 
 
                                            
70 Carlos Ivan Degregori, Shining Path and Counterinsurgency Strategy Since the Arrest of 
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Figure 3.   Sendero Luminoso Militants Captured by Month: 1991-1995. (From: 
Peruvian Counterterrorism Directorate). 
 
As noted in Fig. 2, after a peak of almost 300 attacks in July 1992, the 
terrorist activities dropped off during August to 117, in September there were 
165, and in October the activities went down to 119.  However, in November they 
increased to 272. Probably, after a period of recovering from the capture of the 
political bureau, the terrorist group reorganized itself and followed the orders 
given by Guzman from the cage. While the number of SL actions increased after 
Guzman was imprisoned, the actions were not as well-coordinated as before. In 
addition, the number of frustrated attacks increased, indicating that militants with 
less military experience were going into action.71 From that point on, terrorist 
activities declined until March 1993 with 79 activities, and the trend continued 
downward until December 1995, which saw only seven attacks. Yet the terrorists' 
activities didn’t stop dramatically after the capture of Guzman. 
Once Guzman was in his cell, DINCOTE was able to apprehend all the 
militants known to be related to the operation; they hit a blow at the mid-level 
cadre of SL. As was noted earlier, there were more factors playing into the defeat 
                                            
71 Degregori, 95.  
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of SL; however, given that the terrorist organization was hierarchical and 
centralized, it was necessary to capture its leaders and middle management. In 
addition, within a year of his capture, Guzman came to an agreement with the 
government that he would sign letters calling on his militants to surrender.  In any 
case, this was also a consequence of his capture.  
As seen in Fig. 3, up until July 1992, the curve that represents the number 
of terrorists captured seems stable.  In August 128 terrorists were captured; in 
September, 209; and in October, 254. Then the curve descends for three months 
and then reaches its highest peak in February 1993, with 337. The judicial 
systems and regulations were in effect since 1991, the Rondas Campesinas 
were a slowly developing process (mainly in the Andes), but here the impact that 
Guzman’s capture had on the militants is clearly visible. Only after his capture did 
the militants massively embrace the law allowing repentance and collaborate with 






A. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP’S VARIABLES FOR SUCCESS 
1. Decision Making Capability 
Due to the uncertain consequences, hunting for terrorist leaders, raises 
questions about who should make the decisions regarding the timing of the 
seizures once the suspects are tracked. The capture of a top terrorist leader 
represents a high achievement for the administration in office, but a preference 
for the best political moment over the correct tactical timing may push politicians 
to choose to capture mid-level targets merely to deliver results to the public.  
The Peruvian police have a military organization based on hierarchy and 
seniority. In 1990, when SIG began to function, the chief of police allowed them 
to report the results of their operations directly to him, giving SIG a high degree 
of autonomy to make decisions at the tactical level. The other operative units of 
DINCOTE, called deltas, did not enjoy this privilege.  
Allison and Zelikow present three models for decision making processes: 
the rational actor model, based on a direct analysis of the relationship of cost and 
utility; the organizational behavior model, which considers the process resulting 
from the outputs of a large number of organizations among which primary 
responsibility for particular tasks is divided; and the government politics model, 
where many actors are players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on 
many diverse problems and who thus cannot act in terms of a consistent set of 
strategic objectives but rather must make decisions according to various 
conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals.72  
The issue of political influence is quite important in the case study of this 
thesis. The reason Fujimori gave for dismissing the Congress was to overcome 
the constraints that the legislature put on the executive’s counterterrorism 
initiatives. After the autogolpe on April 5, 1992, all presidential decrees were 
operative, but without important results. The administration was eager to achieve                                             
72 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 2nd Ed. (New York: Addison-
Wesley Educational Publishers, 1999), 13, 143, 255.  
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an important success to demonstrate the correctness of the president’s decision 
to dismiss the Congress and to gain international support. On the other hand, 
information leakages may occur, not to mention that politicians in the government 
may not agree with operations like this or with the government’s policy in general. 
Another consideration was that according to the same presidential decree, the 
chiefs of the armed forces and police were appointed by the president and could 
remain in power until he deemed otherwise. The relationship became 
personalized rather than institutional; this enabled the president to co-opt one 
sector and assert control over the rest73 and at the same time push the chiefs to 
press their units to produce results as quickly as possible, disregarding the 
strategic profit that might be lost by not waiting.  
The governmental politics model applied by President Fujimori, his 
administration, and the police command observed the intermediate-term goal of 
saving the administration’s term, overlooking the set of risks brought on by 
following that chain of command. On the other hand, SIG leaders were mission 
oriented and, using the rational actor model, balanced the payoffs of following the 
SL chain of command; they made their tactical decisions according to the outputs 
of each operation that might lead them to the final outcome, which was the 
capture of the terrorist leader. SIG leaders used three criteria to finish an 
operation. First, the issue of timing: based on experience, they estimated that 
after three months an operation becomes logistically hard to sustain due to SIG 
resource limitations; and also unstable, so the balance could fall to whichever 
side acts first. Second, the exigency if the surveillance groups were discovered 
and the target could warn the entire network echelon. Third, the consequences if 
the complete terrorist network echelon were to be discovered. Due to the 
obstacles and constraints described in Chapter III, and given the dire political 
situation in which Fujimori’s administration was governing, SIG leaders  were 
ordered to “report all relevant information, and ask permission to carry on any 
                                            
73 Carlos Ivan Degregori, Shining Path and Counterinsurgency Strategy Since the Arrest of 
Abimael Guzman, Institute for Peruvian Studies, 1993, 86. 
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seizure operation, to the Counter Terrorism Directorate."74 However, in order to 
avoid this procedure, the leaders reported seizures afterwards, arguing that 
these were emergency situations where the targets discovered the surveillance 
and would endanger the operation.  They did not act as soon as they could to 
apprehend a mid-level cadre, rationally thinking that this lower-middle level target 
might lead to more apprehensions.  
Decision making capability at the tactical level was given to SIG at the first 
by superiors.  Later when they experienced the pressures of the political 
moment, SIG leaders took their decision making capability for granted, evaluating 
the situation on the ground according to their mission.  
2. Leadership  
In order to control an organization the leaders must have authority and 
execute effective leadership. Authority is the force for achieving desired 
outcomes that is prescribed by the formal hierarchy and reporting relationships.75 
It may be based on rational, traditional or charismatic grounds.76 The hierarchical 
police organization empowers the officers in charge with the authority to 
command the unit, formally speaking. Their authority is based on rational 
grounds (legal authority). 
On the other hand, the leadership issue depends entirely on the leader’s 
ability to gain it. Jago notes that  
Leadership is both, a process and a property. The process of 
leadership is the use of non-coercive influence to direct and 
coordinate the activities of the members of an organized group 
toward the accomplishment of group objectives. As a property, 
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75 Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design (Mason, South Western 
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leadership is the set of qualities or characteristics attributed to 
those who are perceived to successfully employ such influence.77 
SIG leaders had to be able to not only manage personnel, but also to lead 
them, to indoctrinate them in the defense of democratic values, and to keep the 
group cohesive and integrated. Democratic values and correct police procedures 
were established long before but were not conscientiously applied.  
Miyashiro and Jimenez based their leadership on two pillars: First, their 
theoretical knowledge of SL ideology and their practical experience in combating 
it; and second, their clean police record and personal background, which allowed 
them to start the practice of “leading by example.” The two officers came from the 
DINCOTE ranks and formed the SIG from scratch, according to their own 
personal characteristics. This was a different situation from that of the delta unit 
leaders who took charge of already-organized units that were resistant to 
change. The constituency of SIG was mostly officers.  At the time of the Victoria 
Operation, there were 55 officers out of 82 people in the SIG ranks. The 
commanders passed down the “lead by example” practice to the leaders in each 
group to maximize integrity and control. In addition, the leaders intended to 
extend the unit nationwide if the subversive condition made it necessary, and 
intended to use these officers to spread SIG’s culture. From the foundation of a 
new organization, the leaders built a culture that was transmitted to the new 
recruits during their training in the classroom and later in the field, always 
absorbing elements in small groups so they would assimilate SIG culture and not 
bring their foreign culture to distort the SIG culture.  
3. Secrecy and Isolation 
One can observe the effects of secrecy under two conditions: when 
members of organizations attempt to keep certain information from those outside 
the organization (external secrecy) and when members of organizations keep 
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information from other members (internal secrecy).78 In this case study, the 
reasons for keeping external secrecy were quite clear, due to circumstances 
explained above, and for obvious security purposes as well.  However, as a side 
effect, external secrecy “strengthens the organization by emphasizing its 
boundaries as necessary for collective identity. The members shield secret 
information from those who doesn’t belong to the group, emphasizing mutual 
allegiance,”79 enhancing cohesion, and establishing differences that, in this case, 
separated SIG members from DINCOTE, their mother unit. On the other hand, 
inside the organization information was compartmentalized, and agents knew 
only what was necessary for them to know in regard to their specific operations. 
Surveillance teams knew about their targets only, to the point that sometimes 
agents were surprised by running into each other when their targets met.  At 
such times, the Office of Basic Information would disclose the necessary 
information to both teams.80 
SIG offices were located within a police facility; however, the leaders 
isolated the agents physically from other units, at the beginning providing private 
offices and later occupying an entire floor of the building with restricted access. 
Isolation was necessary not only for security purposes, but also because the 
SIG's innovative methods and the early achievements raised jealousy in other 
units.  They called them extraterrestrials or simply crazy,81 but were always 
eager to get information from them.   
According to the MOI used by SIG, the intelligence and operations phases 
were a closed cycle that involved individuals from the same organization.  They 
could rotate from function to function, from the surveillance units to the criminal 
                                            
78 Gary Alan Fine and Lory Holyfield, “Secrecy, Trust, and Dangerous Leisure: Generating 
Group Cohesion in Voluntary Organizations,” Social Psychology Quarterly 59, no. 1 (March 
1996): 30, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0190-
2725%28199603%2959%3A1%3C22%3ASTADLG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5. Accessed October 17, 
2005. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Major PNP Ruben Zuniga, interview by author, tape recording, Lima, Peru, August 12, 
2005. 
81 Colonel PNP (r) Benedicto Jimenez, interview by author, tape recording, Lima, Peru, 
August 13, 2005.  
52 
investigations, but they didn’t rotate to other units in the police, as would normally 
occur every two years.  SIG agents stayed in SIG; the unit grew only by gaining 
new officers and agents.  
4. Exclusive Dedication  
The Peruvian National Police is a divisional organization82 subdivided into 
directorates and regions (as divisions) that are focused on precise tasks. 
DINCOTE, as one of the divisions, was tasked with the counterterrorism battle in 
the country, and sub-assigned specific tasks again to subordinate units. As 
discussed in Chapter III, SIG was assigned the capture of SL’s terrorist leaders.  
However, due to its initial successes, the police chiefs assigned them tasks other 
than the original, from capturing other MRTA targets, to keeping surveillance on 
personal enemies.83 SIG performed well, taking apart the MRTA ideological 
school with its leader Alberto Galvez and nine other cadres on May 31, 1991. But 
right after that, SIG agreed with the director that they would keep to their original 
mission. The procedures they developed were taught to their sister units within 
the DINCOTE, but they were not assigned any more unrelated cases.  
Government personnel systems in agencies with far-flung responsibilities 
generally are biased toward frequent rotation at the expense of lengthy exposure. 
There is an advantage in having broadly experienced employees but there is also 
an advantage in having highly expert employees.84 In addition, the Peruvian 
police promotion system requires that officers attend to certain training and 
grants extra points for special deployments. SIG opted for the approach of having 
highly expert agents so as to take advantage of their experience. In the same 
fashion, the SIG command retained all police officers who were recruited and 
indoctrinated from their entry into SIG up until the day the group was disbanded. 
Furthermore, the SIG command tried to recruit either fresh agents or 
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recommended agents experienced in SL counterterrorism in order to take 
advantage of their knowledge.  
B. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
1. High Technology vs. Human Intelligence 
Hunting terrorist leaders in Third World countries cannot rely heavily on 
high technology devices that require regular support from retransmitters or 
advanced support technology. Databases and state records are frequently 
inexact and unreliable, national identity documents can be counterfeited and high 
security devices for them are unavailable. This environment requires the use of 
deep human investigation work to gather information about the suspects.  
2. Keep it Small and Focused 
Specialized units like SIG need to remain small. The use of direct 
supervision as a coordination mechanism necessitates keeping it that way, as 
does the necessity of keeping track of recruitment. Once personnel are recruited 
they are hard to fire--that would send a message of intolerance of failure, but also 
would reduce the agents' willingness to take risks and would affect morale. The 
leaders have to keep tight informal links between themselves and the members.  
3. Learning How to Share Information Takes Time 
In an ideal situation, intelligence sharing would be the reasonable decision 
for organizations seeking common final goals.  However, in situations like the 
one that SIG confronted, where professional jealousy is rampant and rivals don’t 
help in the pursuit of objectives but only erect obstacles to success, there was no 
chance of changing everybody else’s cultural values regarding individuality and 
self-interest in time to take advantage of interagency collaboration. Information 
handled by SIG might have been useful for other delta units or other branches of 
service, and vice versa, but sharing information might also affect operational 
security.  
4. Prioritize the Goals at All Levels 
For the decision making process the goal of hunting terrorist leaders must 
remain as paramount for strategic political decision makers, as well as for the 
operative decision makers. The capture of a terrorist leader with the influence 
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that Guzman had over his followers, as was demonstrated, could not be 
downplayed against the best political moment, as SIG leaders feared would 
happen. 
5. Multi-approach Strategy 
Manhunting missions in this case study served as a booster that activated 
other governmental counterterrorism procedures for the defeat of SL in Peru; 
however, the apprehension of Guzman was not the only factor. Even when the 
leader was captured, it was necessary to weaken the terrorist organizational 
structures in rural areas by using the Rondas Campesinas, improving social 
conditions, and offering an alternative through new legislation for repentant 
militants.  
6. Clean Job, No Shot 
The SIG agents' achievement demonstrated the possibility of capturing 
terrorist leaders based mainly on intelligence, avoiding the use of force.  In the 
aftermath of counterinsurgencies procedures, the common factor is the violation 
of human rights by state actors and the consequent years-long legal processes 
that sustain the country's social fractures. Unlike many of their colleagues from 
other branches, SIG leaders were not charged with human rights abuses.  
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